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THE STRUGGLE TO "GREEN"
GATT: FREE TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WAKE OF THE UNITED
STATES-MEXICO TUNA-DOLPHIN DISPUTE
TIMOTHY GOPLERUD"

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 16, 1991, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)' dispute panel ruled that a United States embargo of Mexican
tuna products imposed pursuant to a U.S. dolphin-protection statute
violated GATT rules.2 The ruling sparked protest from a wide array of
environmentalists and public interest groups and raised the question of
what means national governments may employ to protect the environment
while maintaining consistency with GATT. The ruling has been
interpreted as a major setback for effective international environmental
protection.
The GAIT Panel Ruling brings the issue of harmonization of
environmental protection and free trade laws to the fore at a crucial time
for the United States, as the new administration attempts to successfully
conclude two major free trade initiatives, the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Uruguay Round of GATT talks. Increasing concern
regarding environment/free trade conflicts comes at a precarious time for
both of these agreements. It is unclear what environmental ramifications
the GAT panel will have on both agreements.
This Article presents a brief history of the events leading up to the
August 1991 panel hearing, a summary of the panel's findings, and an
update of subsequent developments. It examines reactions to the report
and its impact on international trade and environmental regulations. In
addition, the Article discusses proposals for resolving the conflicts between
the panel's findings and important provisions of certain international
agreements, concluding that the environmental and free trade policies
* B.A. Yale University, 1983; J.D., M.B.A. Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William & Mary expected 1994.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 1987.
2. GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement PanelReport on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (submitted to the parties,
August 16, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Panel Report].
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agreements, concluding that the environmental and free trade policies
would be served best by a compromise measure allowing at least a limited
use of unilateral measures within the existing GATT provisions.
Although more than a year-and-a-half has passed since the panel
made its findings, little closure has been achieved with regard to the
dispute. Notwithstanding the results of the panel hearing and the efforts
of Mexico and the United States to reach a bilateral understanding, the
embargo remains in place. Meanwhile, the European Community and the
United States are engaged in an embargo-related dispute hearing of their
own, and a GATT Committee is re-examining the environmental aspects
of the GATT provisions. The panel and the committee's findings are not
expected until the end of the year.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
The Mexican tuna-dolphin dispute arose from United States
enforcement action pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972 (MMPA).3 MMPA was enacted in 1972 to reduce the number of
dolphins being killed as a result of purse-seine nets used for tuna fishing.
These nets are devastatingly effective and can be used to surround and
capture entire schools of tuna. Unfortunately, their thoroughness makes
them highly wasteful, because they take in everything they encircle,
whether it is destined for processing or not. In the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean (ETP), dolphins frequently swim in th'e company of schools
of tuna. This dolphin behavior is unique to dolphins swimming in the
ETP, and, in combination with the practice of purse-seine net fishing, has
led to an alarming dolphin-kill rate estimated to be over 300,000 per year
during the early 1970s." The purpose of the MMPA was to bring this
appalling rate of incidental dolphin-taking to more acceptable levels.
Under MMPA, if a country's fishing operations incidentally take
more than one and a quarter times the number of marine mammals (e.g.,
dolphins) incidentally taken by the United States during the same time
period, the Secretary of the Treasury bans imports of that country's fish
and fish products. The Secretary also bans imports from other countries

3. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp.
1992).
4. 134 CONG. REc. S 16,336, S 16,344 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988)(statement of Sen. Breaux).
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which buy fish for re-export from the offending country.'
Under the pressure of a federal district court order", the Bush
Administration reluctantly issued a ban on imports of tuna and tuna
products from Mexico and Venezuela effective February 22, 1991. The
Earth Island Institute, a California lobbying group which brought suit to
compel the government to issue the embargo, compelled the pro-trade
Bush Administration was to enforce the act. On March 15, 1991, the
National Marine Fisheries Service announced a second embargo on Italy,
France, Spain and Britain to be effective May 24, 1991." It was imposed
because these countries imported tuna from the countries against whom the
first embargo was directed.
Mexico objected to the imposition of the tuna embargo, and on
January 25, 1991 it requested that a GATT dispute panel hear the matter,
in accordance with official GAIT procedures.' The Panel found in
Mexico's favor on August 16, 1991, and declared that the United States
embargo violated several GATT principles. 9 The panel held that both the
direct and the intermediary embargoes violated Article XI: 1, which forbids
quantitative restrictions on imports." Neither Articles XX(b) or XX(g)
justified the direct embargo against Mexico. Articles XX(b), (d) or (g),
which provide exceptions for measures necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health; measures necessary to secure compliance with laws
or regulations, which are not inconsistent with GATT; or measures relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures*are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption did not validate the indirect embargo against European
Community."
In addition, the panel found that the Pelly Amendment, which gives
the President discretion whether to impose an embargo on fishery or

5. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2XB)(ii)(V)(C).
6. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964,975-76 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 929
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
7. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,367 (1991).
8. GAIT, supra note 1, art. XXIII.
9. PanelReport, supra note 2, para. 7.1 (a), (b).
10. "No prohibitions or restrictions... whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party.
." GATT, supra note 1, Article XI: I,
as cited in PanelReport, supra note 2, para.
5.18.
11. Id.. para. 7.1(b).
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wildlife products for the violation by other countries of "international
2
was not
fishery or endangered or threatened species programs,"'
3
inconsistent with the GATT "as such."' This determination was based
on the distinction that enforcement was discretionary and on the fact that
the Pelly Amendment explicitly states that such prohibition be
4
implemented to the extent that it is sanctioned by GATT.
Finally, the panel determined that the Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act's labeling provisions did not violate GAIT's most-favored
nation provision 5 because the restrictions on the right to use the
"Dolphin Safe" label applied equally to all countries fishing in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean and "thus did not distinguish between products
6
other countries."'
originating in Mexico and products originating in
The United States argued that even if Mexico were correct in
arguing that these measures violated certain GATT provisions, the
embargoes were valid exceptions of the kind GATT allows under Art. XX.
The GATT panel interpreted the Art. XX exceptions quite narrowly and
decided the issue in Mexico's favor. The panel stated that such a literal
interpretation of the broad language used in the exception provisions would
lead to abuse. Because the exceptions did not themselves "specify criteria
limiting the range of life or health protection policies, or resource
conservation policies, for the sake of which they could be invoked", it was
thus incumbent on the contracting parties themselves "to impose limits on
the range of policy differences justifying such responses and to develop
criteria so as to prevent abuse."" The panel suggested that instead of
seeking an Art. XX exception, the United States should initiate an
amendment or supplement to the provisions of GAIT, or apply for a
waiver of GAIT obligations. 8
The Panel also held that Article XX only protects conservation
measures within a country's own jurisdiction. Countries "may not restrict
imports of a product merely because it originates in a country with
environmental policies different from its own."' 9 The panel discouraged

12. Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, Pub.L. No. 95-376, 92
Stat. 714 (1978) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982)).
13. Panel Report, supra note 2, pam. 5.21.
14. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

GATT, supra note 1, art. 1:1.
Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 5.43.
Id., para. 6.3.
Id. note 2, para. 6.3.
Id., para. 6.2.
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unilateral conservation measures. The United States had not proven that
it sufficiently pursued GATr-consistent measures, such as the negotiation
of international cooperative arrangements to achieve its objectives."
In its concluding remarks, the panel hastened to add that GATT
actually imposed few constraints on the ability of signatory nations to
implement their environmental policies domestically.21 The panel
determined that nations may "tax or regulate imported products and like
domestic products" as long as those taxes and regulations "do not
discriminate against imported products or afford protection to local
producers ....42
III. EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE PANEL RULING
Because Mexico did not press the GATT Council to adopt the panel
report, the ruling has no legal force. 23 During this dispute, Mexico and
the United States were negotiating the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and Mexico was concerned about disrupting these
negotiations. At the March 18, 1992 meeting, Mexico told the GATT
Council that Mexico and the United States were concluding a bilateral
agreement for the protection of dolphins which would render the
enforcement of the panel verdict unnecessary. 1 The two countries
negotiated eighteen changes in their own laws aimed at achieving a
satisfactory level of dolphin protection within two years.25
The United States agreed to lift the tuna embargoes and Mexico
and Venezuela agree to a five-year moratorium on the effect of purse-seine
nets on dolphin populations, to begin March 1, 1994. This agreement was
embodied in an amendment to the MMPA entitled the "International
Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992,.26 which President Bush signed into

20. Id., para. 5.28.
21. Id., para. 6.2.
22. Id.

23. U.S. Comes Under Pressure Over Tuna Embargo, The Reuter Library Report, Apr.
30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lbyrpt File.
24. GAIT Keeps Tuna Fish Dispute Alive, Inter Press Service, Mar. 19, 1992, available

in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File.
25. Id.
26.1nternational Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Star. 3425
(1992).
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law on October 27, 1992.'
While Mexico and the United States worked to end the dispute by
means outside of GATT, the European Community and several Latin
-American countries urged the GAT Council to adopt the panel ruling and
threatened to pursue independent complaints if the Council did not. The
European Community insisted on the adoption of the Panel Report
"because the principles involved [were] too important to be set aside" and
it presented "an ideal chance to 'put a modicum of order into the
relationship between trade and the environment.' ' 28 The European
Community representatives even hinted at possibile collusion between
Mexico and the United States, citing a "'growing tendency' of the United
States to make bilateral deals with [some of its] trading partners --- deals
... that tend to squeeze out the European Community and other trading
partners. ,,29
IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TUNA EMBARGO
The embargo was not without economic side-effects. The world
tuna market collapsed as non-dolphin-safe tuna which was denied entry
into the United States flooded other markets." The tuna Latin American
countries could not sell to the United States flooded Europe and Europe
was also denied the ability to serve as an intermediary exporter between
those countries and the United States." As a result, an oversupply of
tuna in the European Community market depressed prices and hurt the
European Community's own tuna fishing industry, which had a better
dolphin protection record than Mexico, because its fishing vessels operate
in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans where tuna and dolphin do not swim

27. Bush Signs Bill to Protect Dolphins. Says Certain Provisions Advisory Only, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1872 (Oct. 28, 1992).
28. EC Urges Adoption of Tuna Report But U.S., Mexico Claim Accord is Near, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 524 (Mar. 25, 1992).
29. Joel Havemann, EC Calls California Recycling Law a Trade Issue, L.A. TIMES,
April 10, 1992, at D2.
30. Fisheries Conservation: GATT Council Agrees to Panel on US Tuna Embargo, EUR.
ENV'T, July 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Eurenv File.
31. GATT: Mexican Timidity Behind EC Request for US Tuna Ban Panel, EUR. ENV'T,
June 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Eurenv File.
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together.32
European Community leaders considered a ban of their own on
non-dolphin-safe tuna during this time." The European Community
Fisheries Commissioner, Manuel Matin, commented that "the European
Community would 'invite' Mexico and other countries to stop using
encircling nets."' Manin sought a ban like that of the United States on
non-dolphin-safe tuna, but the other Commissioners opposed it as
inconsistent with the European Community's GATT obligations and the
position it was defending in the tuna dispute panel." The European
Community fisheries ministers did agree October 19, 1992, to ban the use
of purse-seine nets on European Community tuna fishing vessels, but no
ban on dolphin-unsafe tuna imports was forthcoming.'
A report prepared by the external economic relations committee for
the European Parliament criticized the European Community Commission
for its reaction to the United States-Mexico Tuna Dispute, suggesting that
its interest in the dispute was motivated more by economic than by
environmental concerns. According to the report's authors, the European
Community Commission "only began to show an interest in the animal
welfare aspects of the case when it seemed that the impending moratorium
might lead to the emergence on the European market of the one million
tons of canned tuna [then] lodged in Mexican warehouses."'37
As this sequence of events reveals, well-intentioned,
environmentally-motivated trade sanctions can have damaging economic
side-effects and can lead to ever-widening cycles of protectionist behavior
-- behavior which may be engaged in with or without the accompanying
pretense of environmental concern. GAIT enforcement authorities must
be able to draw the line at some point, in order to prevent the agreement
from collapsing. The question is how and through what means.
On July 14, 1992, the same day that the European Community

Commission asked Mexico and Venezuela to stop their use of purse-seine
32. EC Moves to Protect Dolphins in the Pacific, The Reuter Library Report, Oct. 19,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lbyrpt File.
33. FisheriesConservation, supra note 30.
34. European Community Demands End to Dolphin Killing, Notimex Mexican News
Service, July 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Notimx File.
35. FisheriesConservation, supra note 30.
36. EC Moves to Protect Dolphins in the Pacific, supra note 32.
37. EC Parliament Adopts Two-Year 'Moratorium on GAIT Panel Environmental
Decision, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Jan. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Drexec File.
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nets, the GATT Council finally agreed to the European Community's
request for the establishment of a dispute panel on the United State's
intermediary embargo of European Community tuna products. By
September 4, 1992, selection of panel members was underway." The
first set of hearings on the intermediary embargo were held March 30 and
31st, 1993."9 Due to the confidentiality of the hearings, the arguments
are not presently available to the public and presumably will not be
available until a final decision is reached, which may be as late as
September 1993.'
Although GATT and European Community officials have defended
the correctness of the panel ruling, both GATT and the European
Community are now re-evaluating their policies with regard to
environmental protection and free trade. On January 26, 1993, the
European Parliament endorsed its external economic committee's proposal
calling for a two-year moratorium on GATT panel hearings regarding
environmental issues. 41 Apparently the European Parliament realizes that
consistent and satisfactory rulings require a more settled policy than
currently exists. Further clarification of GATT policy is expected by the
end of 1993, when the GATT Council will debate the findings of its Group
and Trade, which has been resurrected after a long period
on Environment
2
of inactivity.

V. REACTION TO THE DISPUTE RULING
A. Criticisms of the Ruling
The GATT panel ruling was vehemently denounced by
environmentalists, who claimed that the ruling threatened to unravel much
of the progress that has been made in international environmental
protection. Representative Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Health and the

38. GAIT: USTR Says Selection Underwayfor Second GAiT Panelon Tuna Embargo,
Int'l. Trade Daily (BNA), Sept. 4, 1992.
39. Telephone interview with Serena Wilson, official with the National Marine Fisheries
Service (April 8, 1993).
40. Id.
41. EC Parliament Adopts Two-Year Moratorium, supra note 37.
42. GAIT Group Agrees to Step Up Work on Trade, Environmental Coordination, 15
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 831 (Dec. 16, 1992).
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Environment, called the ruling "a worst-case scenario come true -- repeal
of a vital environmental law because of conflict with a trade
agreement. 43 The ruling is regarded as a threat to the enforcement
provisions of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer, " which allows the use of import and export bans not only on the
basis of what the products themselves contain45 but on the basis of what
The ruling also poses
substances were used in their production."
difficulties for the United Nations Conference of the Environment and
Development's commitment to make product prices reflect the
environmental costs incurred in their manufacture.47
Both of these environmental measures conflict with the principle
in the panel report that no less favorable treatment be accorded an
imported product "as a product" than is given to a like domestic product.
Consideration of the difference in environmental costs of producing each
product is not allowed, because it would restrict a country's importation
of a product "merely because it originates in a country with environmental
policies different from its own."" Environmentalists argue that the
UNCED Climate Change Convention, the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, and the UNCED's "Agenda 21" all imply that
environmentally-motivated unilateral measures are appropriate under
international law. 9

B. Defenses of the Ruling
As a test case for establishing the appropriateness of unilateral
environmental protection measures, the Mexican Dolphin-Tuna dispute has
certain undeniable weaknesses. Although the wastefulness of incidental
dolphin kills from purse-seine net fishing is startling, and the unnecessary
deaths of creatures as appealing and intelligent as dolphins readily invites

43. Stuart Auerbach, GATT Rule on Wildlife Stirs Alarm: Environmentalists Say U.S.
Laws Hurt, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at DI.
44. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
45. Id., art. 4(1)-(3).
46. Id., art. 4(4).
47. Official Defends EnvironmentalPolicy, Says GATT Rules Give Scope for Protection,

15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 595 (Sept. 23, 1992).
48. PanelRuling, supra note 2, para. 6.2.
49. Official Defends Environmental Policy, supra note 47.
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public concern, the fact remains that dolphins are not an endangered
species." The most damaging aspect of the United States' case was that
the language of the MMPA and the circumstances of its implementation
suggested protectionist motives at least as readily as environmental
concern. The method used to set the limit on incidental dolphin takings
for non-United States tuna vessels is especially susceptible to a
protectionist interpretation.
The MMPA sets "a prospective absolute yearly ceiling" for
domestic vessel incidental dolphin takings, but then requires that "foreign
tuna producers meet a retroactive and varying ceiling for each period based
on actual dolphin taking by the domestic tuna fleet in the same time
period."5' To avoid a ban on its tuna products, the country would have
to retrospectively calculate what 125% of the United States dolphin capture
level was for the past year and meet that limit. This practice appears to
give the United States tuna fishing industry considerably greater leeway
over its competitors fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. In light of its
previous finding, the panel found it unnecessary to conclude that Mexican
tuna was being treated less favorably than United States tuna, but the panel
felt that this aspect of the MMPA's requirements "could give rise to
legitimate concern. .. ,2 This difference in methods of calculating limits
for domestic versus foreign fishing vessels clearly contributed to making
the United States' case less sympathetic.
Those wishing to downplay the effect of the decision note that the
GATT Council still has not adopted the panel report, implying that its
precedential value is weak. However, panels have been known to cite
unadopted panel reports as authority,53 therefore, the report would
arguably have a greater effect in the context of GAT' than would be the
case in a system with-an established doctrine of "stare decisis."
Supporters of the decision also note that the panel report did not
eliminate the use of import restrictions in all cases.- It merely reasserted
the fundamental free-trade principle that domestic goods cannot be
accorded treatment more favorable than imports. Restrictions may
legitimately be placed on imports for environmental reasons, but only if
50. The Greening of Protectionism. THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25.
51. Panel Ruling, supra note 2, para. 5.16.
52. Id.
53. See "United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages," para. 5.79,
as cited in Steve Chamovitz, GAIT and the Environment, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 203, 233
n. 146 (1992).
54. Official Defends EnvironmentalPolicy. supra note 47, at 596.
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these restrictions are applied equally so as not to discriminate in favor of
domestic products."5

C. Defenses of GATT Provisions
GATT officials defend GATT against accusations by
environmentalists that its provisions are incompatible with adequate levels
of international environmental protection. The chairman of the Group on

Environment and Trade has said that "[i]t is essential to dispel any
misperception that GATT contradicts or puts in jeopardy collective efforts
to address environmental problems. 5 6 GATT apologists assert that its
provisions are consistent with UNCED accords as well as other
international agreements, and that GAIT has not challenged any of the
international environmental agreements environmentalists have cited."
Furthermore, "UNCED agreements such as Agenda 21 support GAIT
positions by calling for an open world market and the removal of

unjustified unilateral trade restrictions." '

VI. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE DIsPuTE

Even though GATT officials have been quick to defend the panel
report, their reconvening of the Group on Environment and Trade (the
Ukawa Committee) after a long period of inactivity indicates the officials
opinion that at least some degree of re-evaluation may be in order. At the
Annual General Meeting of GATT in December 1992, the newly-elected
GATT chairman, Ambassador B.K. Zutshi of India, said that it was
important for GATT to "make development of trade and the environment
mutually supportive.15 9 At that meeting, the reconvened Ukawa
Committee "work[ed] along three parallel tracks:
-

To examine the relationship between GATT's rules and trade

55. Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 5.11.
56. GATT Group Agrees to Step Up Work on Trade, Environmental Coordination, supra
note 42.
57. Official Defends Environmental Policy, supra note 47, at 596.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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provisions contained in existing multilateral environmental
agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer...
- To examine the trade effects of national environmental regulation
and their relationship to GATT; and
-

To study the trade effects of new packaging and labelling

requirements aimed at protecting the environment."6

A GAT Council debate on the relationship between trade and the
environment is anticipated upon the Ukawa Committee's production of
definitive findings, but such findings are not expected until the end of
1993.61 The GAIT Council will keep the Ukawa Committee's work
under review until then. In the meantime, it may be useful to look at each
of these areas in turn and to investigate what approaches the Committee
might consider.
VII. GATT

AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

The panel expressed a preference for "international cooperative
agreements
over unilateral actions as a means for protecting the
environment. But environmentalists fear that the panel ruling may
seriously limit the effectiveness of international cooperative agreements
aimed at protecting endangered species and the environment, many of
which rely on trade sanctions for their enforcement."
In particular,
critics have expressed concern over the viability of the Montreal Protocol,
which explicitly provides for import and export bans on products
containing CFCs' or which used CFCs in their production. 5
The panel stressed the illegitimacy of restrictions that discriminate
between domestic and imported products based on distinctions other than

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. PanelReport. supra note 2, para. 5.28.
63. Official Defends Environmental Policy, supra note 47, at 596.
64. Montreal Protocol, supra note 44, art. 4(1)-(3).
65. Id., art. 4(4).
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According to the ruling,
their characteristics as products "as such."'
discrimination based on production methods or different environmental
standards observed in production processes are not legitimate grounds for
imposing discriminatory measures on imports.' This aspect of the ruling
constitutes a direct threat to the enforcement provisions of one of the most
effective environmental agreements the international community has
produced. It also undermines any effort to implement a system of pricing
that would include the environmental cost incurred during production.
Such an attempt to account for environmental cost by internalizing the
environmental externalities of production constitutes discrimination based
on characteristics other than those of the product "as such". The exercise
of the Montreal Protocol's enforcement provision is therefore incompatible
with the panel report's interpretation of GAIT principles.
Exclusive reliance on international environmental agreements is
problematic in a number of respects. International agreements often take
a long time to negotiate and implement. In order to secure the desired
numbered of signatories, they often become less restrictive and less
Many of them, including the
binding than originally intended.
International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES)68 , have lenient opt-out provisions. Contracting states
to the ICRW may withdraw from the Convention with as little as six
months notice (five months in some cases). 69 The ICRW places
responsibility for punishing violations on the governments having
It was the very inability of the
jurisdiction over the violators. 0
International Whaling Commission to sanction noncomplying nations under
the ICRW which motivated the United States Congress to enact unilateral
conservation programs such as the MMPA.7 '

IX. THE GATT AND NATIONAL TRADE REGULATION

66. Panel Report. supra note 2, para. 5.11.
67. Id., para. 5.15.

68. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 12 I.L.M. 1085.
69. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. XI, 62
Stat. (2) 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
70. Id.. art. IX(l), (3).
71. BuRNs H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 409-410 (2d
ed. 1990).
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The conflict between enforcement of GATI" obligations and
national environmental regulation have inevitably led to political friction
between GATT authorities and the rule-making bodies of individual
contracting states. Congressional outrage over the panel decision resulted
in the introduction of a resolution calling on the president to "make GATT
rules compatible with existing United States health, safety, labor, and
environmental laws.0 2 A legislative body such as Congress, which does
its work in a public forum through the efforts of elected officials, naturally
objects to the judgement of its measures by a panel of three nonelected
and obscure trade bureaucrats operating in secrecy.
The ineffectiveness of international agreements has spurred the
promulgation of national environmental laws that implement trade
regulation as an enforcement mechanism."' Effective enforcement
schemes that do not employ at least some form of economic coercion
remain elusive. Economic self-interest is the dominant motivating force,
and it is hard to imagine how an effective system of environmental
regulation can operate without use of this primary motivating force.
The effectiveness of national trade regulation in persuading
recalcitrant parties to "come to the table" and negotiate international
agreements should not be overlooked. The negotiation of CITES, for
example, was preceded by a unilateral ban on the importation of
endangered species by the United States in 1969.' * The United States has
been seeking an international dolphin protection agreement for the last two
decades.75 It is unlikely that the dolphin protection measures negotiated
with Mexico could have been elicited without the twin inducements of the
embargo and NAFTA.
The GATT dispute panel held that unilateral national regulations
affecting behaviors outside a state's jurisdiction are illegitimate attempts
by one nation to impose its environmental standards on another.76 There
are circumstances, however, where such unilateral measures would be
appropriate and even desirable.

In a situation such as the imminent

extinction of a species combined with the inability of the international
community to ratify an effective international cooperative agreement, a

72. House Subcommittee Votes to Reject Trade Pacts ContradictingU.S. Law, Int'l Env't

Daily (BNA) (May 13, 1992).
73.
74.
75.
76.

Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 5.28.
Steve Chamovitz, GATT and the Environment, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 203, 207 (1992).

Id. at 207.
Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 5.27.
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unilateral act could create an environmental and moral duty. Another
example would be United States action under the Pelly Amendment" and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment78 against a signatory who has opted out
of the ICRW and demonstrated an intent to hunt a whale species to
extinction.

X. TRADE EFFECTS OF PACKAGING AND LABELING REQUIREMENTS
The panel report looked favorably on the use of the "Dolphin Safe"
label and found that measures restricting access to the label's use to tuna
caught in the ETP without the use of purse-seine nets were not contrary
to GATT.79 The panel noted that these measures did "not restrict the sale
of tuna products",' nor did they "establish requirements that have to be
met in order to obtain an advantage from the government. Any advantage
which might possibly result from access to this label.depends on the free
choice by consumers to give preference to tuna carrying the 'Dolphin Safe'
label."8 " The use of consumer choice rather than government-imposed
trade restrictions as a device with which to influence industries to operate
in a more environmentally responsible manner is an appealing free market
approach that would appear to serve both the causes of environmental
protection and free trade. The weakness of this approach is that it could
result in sales too low to support the environmentally responsible
alternative if the premium for the environmentally-responsible product is
too high for the more price-conscious consumer to accept.
Packaging requirements pose even larger problems. A German
packaging law, which became effective in 1991, limits the amount of nonreusable packaging in the country, forcing companies to either develop
recyclable packages for their products or collect their discarded packages
and take them out of Germany."2 If the foreign company cannot collect

77. Pelly Amendment, supra note 12.
78. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 96-61, § 3(a), 93 Stat. 407 (1979) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1821 (1982)).

79. Panel Report, supra note 2. par. 5.44.
80. Id.. pan. 5.42.
81. Id.

82. Joel Havemann, Recycling Law Ignites Trade BarrierDebate, L.A. TIMEs, April 7,
1992, at World Report 7.

WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

230

Vol. 17:215

and recycle the packaging itself, it must pay for someone else to do so."'
Because it is easier and cheaper for domestic companies to retrieve and
recycle their used packaging, foreign companies argue that the practice is
equivalent to a trade barrier against their products." Nonetheless, this
measure would be acceptable under the provisions of GATT as expounded
by the first tuna dispute panel. The German law treats imports no less
favorably than domestic products. That higher costs are incurred by firms
operating outside of Germany importing their products into the country is
no fault of the law but is rather a logistical fortuity which the German law
apparently need not address.

XI. PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND FREE TRADE GOALS

A. Replace GATT
During the June 1992 Global Forum in Rio de Janeiro, a caucus of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) negotiated an Alternative Treaty
to replace GAIT. 5 The NGOs suggested replacing the GATT rules and
its secretive and undemocratic procedures with "an alternative International
Trade Organization . . . designed with a participatory and democratic
structure ensuring transparent, accountable, and equitable decision-making
in accordance with the public interest instead of the corporate interest."8
Although complaints about the secretive and undemocratic aspects of
GAIT procedures are certainly on target, the prospects for starting over,
negotiating an alternative treaty with which to replace GATT, and securing
enough signatories to make it a workable alternative seem quite unlikely.
Despite all the criticism of GATT, it is the most important trade agreement
of the post-war era. No other trade agreement has been as successful in
increasing world living standards. GATT is responsible for much of the
economic prosperity of the period and is not to be tossed aside lightly.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Alternative Treaties Adopted by NGO's Cover Climate Change, Debt, Other Areas,
15 Int'l. Envdl. Rep. (BNA) 443 (July 1, 1992).

86. Id.
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B. Amend GATT and Interpret it in an Environmentally-Sensitive Manner
A more practical alternative would be to negotiate an amendment
to Article XX of GATT allowing countries to impose regulations "relating
to" protection of both their own environment and the global
environment.'
The country imposing the regulation would have to
satisfy the burden of proof as to the consistency of the measure with its
internal environmental policies, thereby establishing that it did not
constitute a protectionist measure in disguise."
The European Community panel dispute presents an opportunity for
resolving the issue in the least-GATT-disruptive manner. The first panel
hearing and the debate which followed it provided an opportunity for
GATT, United States officials and the international community to become
better informed of the complex interactions involved in the dispute and
reconsider their positions. The solution which would be least disruptive
to GATT procedures and the GATT text would be for the United States
Congress initially to amend the MMPA and change the method it uses to
calculate the limit on incidental takings of dolphins.' 9 The explicit use
of United States vessels' practice as a reference standard is too suggestive
of bias. A more objective standard needs to be developed that protects
dolphins but does not so readily evoke suspicions of protectionist motives.
The GATT panel might then be more willing to reconsider the
previous panel ruling and adopt a broader interpretation of the restrictions
on GATIT's Article XX exceptions than was adopted by the first panel,
especially with regard to its restrictive interpretation of "necessary"
measures."
If GATT authorities would commit themselves to the
prudent exercise of the discretionary powers granted them to distinguish
between "disguised restriction[s]" on international trade and good faith
environmental'protection measures, a considerable degree of harmonization
of environmental and free trade goals could be achieved within GAT with
a minimum of upheaval.

XII. CONCLUSION

87.
88.
89.
90.

Eliza Patterson, GATT and the Environment, 26 J.WORLD TRADE 99, 107 (1992).
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 5.28 (referring to limit-setting language of 16

U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(1I)).
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The insistence of the European Community in pursuing its own
panel dispute at the same time that the United States and Mexico have
been seeking a bilateral understanding has undoubtedly been a source of
annoyance to the United States. On the other hand, the European
Community was right in suggesting that the issues involved should not just
be set aside. The opportunity should be seized to "put a modicum of order
into the relationship between trade and the environment,"91 although not
necessarily in the manner in which the European Community has set its
hopes. Unilateral enforcement measures have a role to play within GATT,
even if only a restricted one.
Beyond their immediate consequences to the parties directly
involved in them, the panel hearings have served an important role in
elevating the consciousness of both the international trade and
environmental communities as to the need for greater harmonization of
their seemingly conflicting goals, as well as of the mechanisms that have
The increased scrutiny of
been instituted for achieving them.
negotiation of the Uruguay
ongoing
the
of
NAFTA,
aspects
environmental
round, the second GATT panel hearing, and the Ukawa Committee's study
of environmental and trade issues are all either direct consequences of the
first panel report or have been strongly influenced by it and the reactions
that followed its release. Each of the above is scheduled to be completed
by the end of this year, and the results reached in each should make this
a pivotal year in the development of effective policies and mechanisms for
resolving trade and environmental conflicts in international law.

91. EC Urges Adoption of Tuna Report. supra note 28.

1993]

THE STRUGGLE TO GREEN" GAiT

TIME-TABLE OF TUNA-DOLPHIN DISPUTE RELATED EVENTS

1972

Marine Mammal Protection Act becomes law.

2/22/91

Date on which United States ban on Mexican tuna imports
became effective; embargo imposed under compulsion of
District Court order.

1/25/91

Mexico requests GAIT panel hearing.

3/15/91

Announcement by National Marine Fisheries Service of
secondary embargo to be imposed on Italy, France, Spain
and Britain.

8/16/91

GATT panel issues ruling in favor of Mexico.

10/10/91

President Salinas of Mexico announces intent to defer
enforcement of ruling and hopes for a bilateral solution to
the dispute with the United States without recourse to
GATT procedures; bilateral negotiations ensue.

2/18/92

GATT Council meeting: majority of contracting states
including European Community request adoption of panel
report; Council postpones decision to next Council meeting
due to opposition of United States and Mexico.

3/10/923/11/92

3/18/92

GATT environmental committee meets and decides to begin
work toward harmonization of environmental treaties (e.g.,
the Basel Convention, the Montreal Protocol) with
international trade rules.92
GATT Council meeting: European Community and other
countries renew request to keep Tuna Dispute on GATT
Council agenda; Council agrees to keep Dispute on agenda
for next meeting April 30; United States and Mexico claim
to be on verge of bilateral agreement which would resolve

92. GATT Keeps Tuna Fish Dispute Alive, supra note 24.
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the dispute.93

4/9/92

European Community issues eighth annual report on United
States Trade and Investment Barriers decrying United States
unilateral trade actions as evidence of increased barriers to
trade and growing protectionism.

4/30/92

GATT Council meeting: European Community and several
Latin American countries urge Council to adopt GATT
panel report; European Community states it is in bilateral
negotiations with United States in accordance with GATT's
formal disputes procedure; if no solution worked out before
next GATT council meeting on June 16, 1992, then next
step is to seek a full GATT dispute panel on the issue.

5/12/92

House subcommittee approves resolution (H.R. Con. Res.
246) "warning that Congress will not approve any trade
agreement that jeopardizes United States health, safety,
labor, or environmental laws." 94

6/18/92

Mexico and Venezuela agree to halt killing of dolphins by
March of 1994 in exchange for lifting of embargo; Rep.
Gerry Studds (D-Mass.) introduces bill lifting the embargo;
formal agreement with the two Latin American countries
expected after the International Dolphin Conservation Act
becomes law; Act requires Mexican commitment to stop the

killing of dolphins for five years beginning March 1, 1994.
6/18/926/19/92

GATT Council meeting: GATT Council, following dispute
settlement procedure, delays decision whether to establish
panel until next meeting of the Council on July 14, in order
to allow parties in the dispute to hold bilateral
discussions."

93. Id.
94. House Subcommittee Votes to Reject Trade PactsContradictingU.S. Law, Int'l Env't.
Daily (BNA), May 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Bnaied File.

95. GATT: Mexican Timidity, supra note 31.
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GATT council agrees to European Community request for
dispute panel on United States tuna embargo; 2nd GATT
panel hearing begins.
European Community Commission asks Mexico, Venezuela
and others to stop use of encircling nets in tuna fishing,
claims proposal and panel hearing unrelated."

9/4/92

Panel members are selected for European CommunityUnited States intermediary embargo hearing.

9/24/92

United States House of Representatives approves the
"International Dolphin Conservation Act into law, by which
embargoes on Mexican and Venezuelan tuna may be lifted
conditional to dolphin conservation measures, including a
moratorium on purse-seine net use.

10/19/92

European Community fisheries ministers agree to ban
purse-seine net tuna-fishing by European Community
vessels.

10/27/92

President Bush signs International Dolphin Conservation
Act into law.

12/16/92

United States and European Community hold bilateral
negotiations as preliminary step to panel hearing; European
Community seeks clarification of changes in United States
law concerning definition of "intermediary" nation.

1/26/93

European Parliament endorses external economic relations
committee proposal calling for two-year moratorium on
GATT-panel judgements concerning the environment.

2/4/932/5/93

GAT environmental committee discusses harmonization of
international trade and environmental protection treaties, but
reaches no conclusions.

96. European Community Demands End to Dolphin Killings, supra note 34.
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"Resolution Supporting Whaling Moratorium" (1993 H.R.
Con. Res. 34) reported in the Senate after having passed in

the House February 16, 1993; resolution states that the
sense of the Congress is that "the United States policy
should promote the conservation and protection
of whale, dolphin, and porpoise populations."'7

3/30/93

Panel hearing held on European Community-United States
tuna embargo; proceedings 3/31/93 to be kept confidential
at least until final panel hearing, to be held no earlier than
July 1993."

5/11/93

Scheduled date for submission of simultaneous response
briefs by both European Community and United States"

97. H.R. Con. Res. 34(1), (2), 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
98. Telephone interview with Serena Wilson, official with the National Marine Fisheries
Service (April 8, 1993).
99. Id.

